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Abstract
According to empirical studies, speculators place significant orders in commodity markets
and may cause bubbles and crashes. This paper develops a cobweb model that takes into
account the behavior of technical and fundamental speculators. We find that interactions
between consumers, producers and heterogeneous speculators may indeed produce price
dynamics which mimics the cyclical price motion of actual commodity markets, i.e., irregular
switches between bullish and bearish price developments. We analytically show that as the
number of speculators increases we first observe a pitchfork bifurcation followed by a period
doubling bifurcation. After infinitely many period doubling bifurcations the dynamics
becomes chaotic.
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1 Introduction
A key characteristic of commodity price dynamics is their strong cyclical behavior. Cashin et
al. (2002), who examine the price action of 36 commodities in the period from 1957 to 1999,
report that the average price fall across all commodities was 46 percent during slumps, while
the average price rise across all commodities was 42 percent during booms. Individual price
series are, of course, even more volatile: The price for coconut oil dropped by around 88
percent between June 1984 and August 1986 and the price of coffee arabica increased by
around 84 percent from April 1975 to April 1977. Further empirical evidence of commodity
price fluctuations is provided by Borenzstein et al. (1994) and Deaton (1999). Alterations
between bull and bear markets have important implications for many developing countries
dependent on commodity exports. Dramatic price changes may cause severe fluctuations in
earnings from commodity exports. A thorough understanding of commodity price dynamics is
thus of great significance, especially for policy makers who plan to conduct counter-cyclical
stabilization policies (Newberry and Stiglitz 1981).
Several theories have been proposed which give us valuable insight into the dynamics
of commodity prices. The focus of this paper is on cobweb models (e.g. Coase and Fowler
1937, Ezekiel 1938 or Nerlove 1958) which describe the price dynamics in a market of a non-
storable good that takes one time unit to produce. As a result, suppliers must form price
expectations one period ahead. Such a view is not unrealistic. Consider, for instance, the
cultivation of crops. The growing season guarantees a finite lag between the time the
production decision is made and the time the crop is ready for sale. The decision about how
much should be produced is based on current and past experience. Remember that classical
linear cobweb models with naive expectations are able to reproduce oscillatory price
movements with decreasing amplitude.3
The cobweb approach has been extended in several directions. Exploiting
nonlinearities in demand and supply, Day (1994) and Hommes (1994, 1998) analytically
show the possibility of chaotic price dynamics for different adaptive expectation schemes of
the producers. Our framework is related to the model of Brock and Hommes (1997). In their
contribution, the demand and supply curves are linear, but producers switch between different
forecasting strategies. Depending on publicly available fitness measures, producers opt either
for naive or (costly) rational expectations. The choice is rational in the sense that predictors
with a high level of fitness are preferred. The model not only yields complex price dynamics
but suggests that irregular dynamics may be part of a fully rational notion of equilibrium.
This paper seeks to offer a new perspective of commodity price fluctuations by adding
heterogeneous speculators, i.e. interacting chartists and fundamentalists, to the traditional
cobweb framework. In fact, there exists widespread evidence that private and professional
speculators apply both technical and fundamental analysis to predict commodity price
movements. For instance, Smidt (1965) reports that the majority of the speculators relies at
least partially on price charts to render trading decisions in commodity markets. Similar
results are reported in questionnaire studies of Draper (1985) and Canoles et al. (1998). In
addition, Sanders et al. (2000) find strong evidence of positive feedback trading in several
commodity markets and Weiner (2002) detects herding behavior in the petroleum market.
Overall, these studies indicate that chart and fundamental speculation is a major factor for
price variation in commodity markets.
In line with the early cobweb literature, we construct a behavioral cobweb model with
a supply response lag. The demand and supply schedules of the consumers and producers are
linear and the producers have naive expectations. The market is cleared by the price sensitive
demand of the consumers. But the supply available to consumers also depends on the trading
decisions of the speculators, i.e. their excess selling (buying) increases (decreases) the supply.4
The speculators apply both technical and fundamental methods to predict prices. While
technical analysis extrapolates past price trends into the future, fundamental analysis assumes
that prices converge towards their fundamental values. The speculators are boundedly rational
in the sense that they tend to use forecast rules with a high level of fitness. Note that the
speculators´ switching between technical and fundamental rules introduces a non-linearity
into the model.
We are interested in how speculators may influence the evolution of commodity
prices. Overall, our model is able to generate price dynamics which mimic the cyclical swings
of commodity prices quite well. We analytically derive the following results. Suppose that the
cobweb market is stable without speculators. Then a pitchfork bifurcation, followed by a
period doubling bifurcation, emerge as the total number of speculators increases. Further
simulation analysis reveals that after infinitely many period doubling bifurcations the
dynamics becomes chaotic. For certain parameter values, we observe the emergence of bull
and bear markets, as well as irregular price fluctuations between bull and bear markets.
However, if the demand and supply schedules of the consumers and producers violate
the stability condition, we are able to show analytically that the presence of a critical mass of
speculators may stabilize the market. Instead of a price explosion, the price may settle down
on a complicated attractor, a limit cycle or even a fixed point. This finding is quite
remarkable: The common suggestion to crowd out speculators may not always be beneficial
to market stability. In fact, complex interactions between technical and fundamental
speculators may prevent unstable price trajectories.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a behavioral
cobweb model with heterogeneous boundedly rational speculators. In section 3, we present
our analytical results and in section 4, we numerically illustrate the dynamics. The last section
offers some conclusions and points out some extensions.5
2 A cobweb model with consumers, producers and speculators
2.1 The behavior of consumers and producers
Remember that traditional versions of the cobweb model describe a dynamic price adjustment
process on a competitive market for a single non-storable good with a supply response lag.
Market clearing occurs in every period
t t S D = ,                                                                                                                              (1)
where D and S denote demand and supply, respectively. To keep the model as simple as
possible, we focus on linear demand and supply curves. Consumer demand depends
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The output decision of the producers depends on their price expectations. We assume that
producers have naive expectations (i.e.  1 ] [ − = t t P P E ), which entails a so-called supply
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The coefficients a, b, c and d are non-negative.
In the absence of speculators ( P
t t S S = ), the law of motion of the price, obtained by
combining (1)-(3), is a one-dimensional linear map
1 − −
+
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We regard the fixed point F as the fundamental value of the market. The law of motion may6
be simplified by rewriting (4) in terms of deviations from the fundamental value. Defining
F P X t t − = , (4) becomes
1 − − = t t X
d
b
X .                                                                                                                     (6)
As is well known, market stability requires
1 / < d b .                                                                                                                                   (7)
If (7) holds, P is attracted by F, and X converges towards 0.
1 Furthermore, since the
parameters b and d are positive, the price adjustment is oscillatory.
2.2 The behavior of speculators
Our perspective is that producers such as farmers are mainly concerned with the production
process. At the stock exchange, where commodities are usually traded, many additional
speculators are active. As revealed by empirical studies, private and professional speculators
use technical and fundamental trading strategies to determine their investment decisions
(Smidt 1965, Draper 1985, Canoles et al. 1998, Sanders et al. 2000). Speculators apparently
have a marked influence on the evolution of commodity prices – an aspect which surprisingly
has not received much attention so far.
Interactions between chartists and fundamentalists have already been explored in
detail in several stock market models. So-called fundamentalists are agents who believe in
mean reversion, i.e. they expect prices to return towards fundamentals. Agents using technical
analysis, so-called chartists, bet on the persistence of past price trends. Models by Day and
Huang (1990), Huang and Day (1993), de Grauwe et al. (1993), Brock and Hommes (1998) or
                                                                                        
1 Note that the parameters a and c just shift the demand and supply curves vertically upwards or downwards.
Hence, the price and its fundamental value both increase in a and c, yet X – the law of motion – is independent of
a and c. Without loss of generality one may assume that a and c take values such that prices and production
quantities are always positive.7
Lux and Marchesi (2000) demonstrate that the behavior of heterogeneous speculators may
endogenously create complex financial market dynamics.
Following this branch of research, we assume that speculators are selling (i.e.
increasing the supply) if they expect a decrease in the price and vice versa. The speculators
are heterogeneous with respect to their expectation formation. We enrich the simple cobweb
model (6) by two types of speculators: chartists and fundamentalists. Note that we do not keep
track of the behavior of individual traders; here we are interested in their aggregated impact
on the price dynamics. The total supply may be expressed as
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where  C S  and  F S  are the supply generated by the application of the technical and the
fundamental trading rule, respectively. W stands for the fraction of agents who follow the
technical rule. The market share of fundamentalists is (1-W). N denotes the number of
speculators, which we normalize to  1 0 ≤ ≤ N .
To characterize the behavior of chartists, we adapt a predictor first suggested by Day
and Huang (1990). Chartists optimistically believe in the persistence of a bull market as long
as the price is above its fundamental value. Conversely, in a bear market  ) ( F P < , chartists
pessimistically think that the price will decline further (i.e.  ) ( ] [ 1 1 F P e P P E t t t
C − ′ ′ + = − −
with  1 0 < ′ ′ < e ). The orders generated by technical analysis are thus given as
) ( ) ] [ ( 1 1 F P e P P E e S t t t
C C
t − − = − ′ − = − − ,                                                                      (9)
where  0 > ′ ′ ′ = e e e . Chartists are buying into a rising (bull) market and selling into a falling
(bear) market. Note that (9) implies that changes in the demand of chartists are positively
correlated with changes in the price.
Fundamentalists expect the price to converge towards its fundamental value. Such8
regressive expectations may be formalized as  ) ( ] [ 1 1 − − − ′ ′ + = t t t
F P F f P P E  with  1 0 < ′ ′ < f .
The supply due to the fundamental trading rule is
) ( ) ] [ ( 1 1 − − − − = − ′ − = t t t
F F
t P F f P P E f S ,                                                                        (10)
where  0 > ′ ′ ′ = f f f . Fundamental analysis suggests selling (buying) if the good is
overvalued (undervalued).
The selection of a trading rule depends on market circumstances. The more the price
deviates from its fundamental value, the greater the speculators perceive the risk that the price
path will collapse (i.e. return to F). Hence, the attractiveness of the technical trading rule may
be written as
| ) /( 1 | 1 − − = t
C
t P F Log g A ,                                                                                               (11)
where  0 > g . Clearly, the fitness of technical analysis declines with increasing mispricing.
Conversely, the attractiveness of fundamental analysis may be formalized as
| | 1 − − = t
F
t P F Log h A .                                                                                                        (12)
Since h is a positive coefficient, speculators regard fundamental analysis as more suitable if
the distance between the price and its fundamental value increases.
The fraction of chartists is given as
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According to (13), the fraction of speculators who apply the technical trading rule increases if
the attractiveness of that rule increases. The fraction of speculators who follow the
fundamental trading rules is defined as  ) 1 ( W − . The coefficient  0 ≥ i  measures how sensitive
the mass of traders is to selecting the most attractive rule. For instance, if  0 = i , then the
traders do not discriminate between the options ( 5 . 0 = W ). The higher i, the more speculators9
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Due to its second term, (15) is a one-dimensional non-linear difference equation.
3 Theoretical Analysis
In agreement with the literature (e.g. de Grauwe et al. 1993, Hommes 2001, Westerhoff 2003),
we approximate the decision behavior of the speculators by a bell-shaped switching function.
Thus, (14) entails a quadratic term in the denominator. We are now able to derive important
theoretical insights into the dynamics of our cobweb model which hopefully will improve our
understanding of the workings of commodity markets. In section 4, we also explore the
dynamics of the model for j≠2.
For convenience, we express (15) as
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3 2 1 N N N < < . We are now able to derive the following results (proven in the appendix).10
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Theorem 2: If b<d then the difference equation (16) possesses
(a) a locally stable fixed point at 0 1 = X  for  2 0 N N < < ,
(b) a pitchfork bifurcation at 0 1 = X  for  2 N N = ,
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Theorem 3: If b>d then the difference equation (16) possesses
(a) a locally unstable fixed point at  0 1 = X  for  1 0 N N < < ,
(b) a locally stable fixed point at  0 1 = X  for  2 1 N N N < < ,
(c) for  2 N N ≥  see Theorem 2 (b), (c) and (d).
Observe the fundamental difference between Theorems 2 and 3. If the basic cobweb
market is locally stable (b/d<1), an increase in the number of speculators tends to decrease the
efficiency of the market. A locally stable fixed point equal to the fundamental value is
transformed into one of the two locally stable fixed points unequal to the fundamental value
and then into one of the two period-two cycles. From that point of view it might appear
desirable to ban speculators from the market, for instance by imposing a transaction tax. But
such popular policy advice may easily turn out to be a mixed blessing. If the market becomes
unstable (b/d>1), either due to a technology shock or a shift in the preferences of the
consumers, the existence of a critical mass of speculators (N>N1) guarantees at least some
kind of stability. Instead of an exploding price trajectory, the price either converges towards11
its fundamental value, to one of the two non-fundamental fixed points, to a limit cycle in the
bull or the bear market, or displays complex motion. Thus it might be better to tolerate the
activity of speculators and to accept some mispricing to prevent unstable price paths.
4 Numerical Analysis
Let us carry on the analysis by numerical investigation. Figure 1 presents the bifurcation
diagrams for the model´s six parameters. The bifurcation parameter is increased in 400 steps
as indicated on the axis while the remaining parameters are given as
57 . 0 = N ,  1 = b ,  2 = d ,  10 = e ,  1 = f  and  2 = j .
For each parameter combination, 100 observations are plotted. A transient period of 500
periods has been erased to allow the system to settle down on its attractor.
Figure 1 goes about here
The first panel of figure 1 continues the bifurcation analysis of the previous section.
As can be seen, the more speculators enter the market, the more complex the dynamics. After
infinitely many period doubling bifurcations the dynamics becomes chaotic. Comparable
routes into chaos are observed for parameters b and e. However, there also exist different
routes into chaos, indicating that the model has the potential to produce quite complex
dynamics for a large variety of parameter combinations. Put differently, the emergence of
endogenous price movements is not a special case. From a qualitative point of view one may
say that an increase in both b and e seems to increase the range in which the fluctuations takes
place, whereas an increase in f tends to shrink the upper and lower price boundaries.
Parameters d and j hardly allow such conclusions, which again reveals the model´s strength to
generate complex dynamics.
Figure 2 compares actual prices of agricultural products with simulated prices. The
first, second and third panels display monthly hog prices, corn prices and hog-corn price12
ratios between 1970 and 2002, respectively. All three time series reveal cyclical motion, as is
often reported for commodity markets. Especially the hog-corn price ratio data switches
between high and low price periods.
2 A simulated time series with 250 observations is
depicted in the bottom panel (we use the same parameter setting as in the bifurcation
analysis). Our simple model obviously has the power to mimic complex cyclical patterns.
Although the model is completely deterministic, prices move up and down erratically.
Figure 2 goes about here
Let us try to understand what is going on in the (artificial) market. Since we have set
b/d<1, the price would – in the absence of speculators – settle down at its fundamental value.
However, the presence of speculators destabilizes the market. If the price is close to its
fundamental value, chartism is popular and thus the price is driven away from its fundamental
value. But as the mispricing increases, fundamental trading becomes more fashionable and a
convergence sets in. Since this again favors chartism, the pattern continually repeats itself, but
in a very intricate manner. If the price crosses the fundamental value, a temporary bull market
turns into a temporary bear market or vice versa. To sum up, the price seems to move up and
down erratically in a bull or bear market, and also seems to swing erratically between bull and
bear markets. Such a trajectory qualitatively resembles those displayed in the top three panels.
Let us finally turn to the case in which the basic cobweb market is unstable (b/d>1). If
there are no speculators (N=0), the price diverges from its fundamental value. To be precise,
the dynamics evolves as follows. Suppose the price is above its fundamental value in period
t–1. In the next period, the consumers face an increased supply of the commodity and
                                                                                        
2 Since corn is the primary ingredient of the hog´s diet (it constitutes around 60-65 percent of the total costs of
pig production), the hog-corn price ratio is a general indicator of profitability and, therefore, future changes in
pork production.  Therefore, it is not surprising that Ezekiel´s (1938) hog-corn price ratio figure, ranging from
1900 to 1935, looks, despite technological progress, quite similar to the one displayed here.13
consequently the price drops below its fundamental value. As a result, the producers reduce
their output in period t+1 and the price increases again. Due to b/d>1, the price is now higher
than in period t–1. This pattern repeats itself and the price path explodes.
Contrary to the intuition Theorem 3 shows that speculators may stabilize an otherwise
unstable market although their behavior is in general destabilizing. Figure 3 illustrates this
puzzling feature. It presents a simulation run for the following parameter setting
242 . 0 = N ,  20 = a ,  2 . 2 = b ,  10 = c ,  2 = d ,  10 = e ,  1 = f  and  2 = j .
The first, second, third and fourth panel of figure 3 displays the price of the commodity, the
demand of the consumers, the output of the producers and the net supply of the speculators,
respectively. Note that the price of the commodity switches erratically between bull and bear
markets (as in figure 2), yet does not explode. The reason for this becomes obvious in the
bottom three panels. Note that when the price is high (i.e. above its fundamental value), the
output of the producers is also high. However, this does not automatically lead to a crash in
the next period since the net supply available to the consumers now also depends on the
activity of the speculators. If the price is high, the speculators buy the commodity (see bottom
panel). This reduces the net supply and thus hinders the system from crashing. The same is
true in the opposite case. If the price is low (i.e. below its fundamental value), the output of
the producers is also low. But now the speculators are selling the commodity so that the price
remains in the bull market. Overall, we observe intricate dynamics, mainly due to the
behavior of the speculators, but the system does not run away from its fundamental value.  In
this sense, speculators stabilize the dynamics. The popular recommendation to crowd out
speculators may thus not be beneficial to market stability.
Figure 3 goes about here14
5 Conclusions
For more than 100 years, the regularly recurring cycles in the production and prices of
particular commodities have been studied with great interest (for an early review see Ezekiel
1938). The cobweb framework has become the basic workhorse to explore this phenomenon.
While the early theoretical contributions have been linear in design, a number of promising
non-linear models have also been formulated (Day 1994, Hommes 1994, Brock and Hommes
1997). Without question, all these papers help explain the empirical evidence.
But to our understanding one important aspect has been overlooked. As indicated in
many empirical studies, speculators have a marked impact on the price formation process
(Smidt 1965, Draper 1985, Canoles et al. 1998, Sanders et al. 2000, Weiner 2002). Our paper
extends the basic linear cobweb model with naive expectations and a supply response lag by
the incorporation of heterogeneous interacting speculators. Even in its simple form the model
has the potential to generate cyclical, yet complex, price dynamics. The dynamics live from
the fact that a sufficient fraction of the speculators applies destabilizing technical trading
rules. However, as we have shown analytically, banning speculators from the market may
only be a mixed blessing. Although the speculators might, on average, be regarded as
destabilizing there also exist situations in which they stabilize the dynamics.
The simplicity of our model has been achieved by ignoring some of the details of
commodity markets. We would thus like to point out a number of extensions. First, in our
model, producers and speculators operate on the same time scale. A more reasonable
perspective would be that the producers update their production decision on, say, a weekly or
monthly basis while speculators trade on a daily basis (or even more frequently). An
interesting modification of this model would be to combine different time scales for
speculators and producers. Second, in many agriculture markets we often see interventions by
governments that try to influence prices. Cobweb models are suitable to pre-study the15
consequences of such actions. However, if one omits the impact of speculators, the strategies
may be ill designed. Third, our model is deterministic. By adding dynamic noise one may try
to calibrate the model even more closely to the stylized facts. For instance, one may
investigate the consequences of demand and supply shocks. Finally, since the structure of the
proposed model is quite simple it may be possible to test the model statistically using real
data.16
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The latter two fixed points only exist if N>N2 (see below).
Proof for Theorem 2:
(a) Recall that  X H ∂ ∂ /  denotes the eigenvalue of our one-dimensional map. Since b<d,
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Thus, the fixed point at X=0 is locally stable for  2 0 N N < < .
(b) From (A4) we know that X=0 for N=N2 is a nonhyperbolic fixed point with eigenvalue 1.
















































Thus, X=0 undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation at  2 N N = . See, for instance, Wiggins (1990)
for the requirements of a pitchfork bifurcation.17
(c) Note that
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± = 3 , 2  undergo a period-doubling bifurcation for
3 N N = . See again Wiggins (1990) for the requirements of a period doubling bifurcation.18
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Thus, 0 1 = X  is a unstable fixed point for  1 0 N N < < .
(b)  0 1 = X  is a stable fixed point for  2 1 N N N < <  because of (A4) and (A5).
(c) See proofs of Theorem 2 (b), (c) and (d).19
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Figure 1: Bifurcation diagrams. The bifurcation parameter is increased in 400 steps. For
each value, 100 observations are plotted (a transient period of 500 periods has been erased).
Parameter setting as in section 4 and as indicated on the axis.22















































































Figure 2: Cycles in cobweb markets. The first three panels show the hog price, the corn
price and the hog-corn price ratio between 1970 and 2002 (monthly data, 1970=100). The
fourth panel displays simulated prices for 250 observations.24





































Figure 3: The impact of speculators when b>d. The first, second, third and fourth panel
shows the price of the commodity, the demand of the consumers, the output of the producers
and the supply of the speculators, respectively.